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Abstract
Background: Large, integrated datasets can be used to improve the identification and management of health
conditions. However, big data initiatives are controversial because of risks to privacy. In 2014, NHS England
launched a public awareness campaign about the care.data project, whereby data from patients’ medical records
would be regularly uploaded to a central database. Details of the project sparked intense debate across a number
of platforms, including social media sites such as Twitter. Twitter is increasingly being used to educate and inform
patients and care providers, and as a source of data for health services research. The aim of the study was to
identify and describe the range of opinions expressed about care.data on Twitter for the period during which a
delay to this project was announced, and provide insight into the strengths and flaws of the project.
Methods: Tweets with the hashtag #caredata were collected using the NCapture tool for NVivo. Methods of
qualitative data analysis were used to identify emerging themes. Tweets were coded and analysed in-depth within
and across themes.
Results: The dataset consisted of 9895 tweets, captured over 18 days during February and March 2014. Retweets
(6118, 62 %) and spam (240, 2 %) were excluded. The remaining 3537 tweets were posted by 904 contributors, and
coded into one or more of 50 sub-themes, which were organised into 9 key themes. These were: informed consent
and the default ‘opt-in’, trust, privacy and data security, involvement of private companies, legal issues and GPs’
concerns, communication failure and confusion about care.data, delayed implementation, patient-centeredness, and
potential of care.data and the ideal model of implementation.
Conclusions: Various concerns were raised about care.data that appeared to be shared by those both for and
against the project. Qualitatively analysing tweets enabled us to identify a range of concerns about care.data
and how these might be overcome, for example, by increasing the involvement of stakeholders and those with
expert knowledge. Our findings also highlight the risks of not considering public opinion, such as the potential
for patient safety failures resulting from a lack of trust in the healthcare system. However, caution is advised if
using Twitter as a stand-alone data source, as contributors may lie more heavily on one side of a debate than
another. A mixed-methods approach would have enabled us to complement this data with a more
representative overview.
Background
In recent years, technological improvements across the
globe have led to massive increases in the amount of
data that can be collected, stored, and processed. Large
and complex collections of data, or ‘big data’, can be
used to benefit populations by addressing issues of
national concern [1]. In healthcare, integrated systems
and datasets can be used to identify risk factors for health
conditions, and opportunities for their prevention and
management [2]. Big data is seen as having the potential
to revolutionise healthcare, by enabling the identification
of problems and treatments faster than would otherwise
be possible, and more personalised and accurate predic-
tions of risk [3]. However, there are downsides to such
large, integrated datasets, such as the risk of individual
identification and loss of privacy, and the impracticality
of seeking informed consent from each patient before
accessing their data [4]. As a result, big data initiatives
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such as the care.data project proposed by NHS England,
are often controversial.
Care.data
At the beginning of 2014, NHS England announced they
were spending £1 million on delivering a leaflet entitled
“Better information means better care” to 22 million
homes [5]. The leaflet formed the first part of a publicity
campaign in relation to an initiative known as “care.data,”
whereby aspects of patients’ primary care medical records
would be automatically uploaded monthly to a central
database [6]. However, the leaflet did not contain the
words “care.data” or an opt-out form. Rather, readers were
instructed: “If you have any questions or are not happy
for information about you to be shared, speak to your
GP practice.” The leaflet also contained links to a
dedicated telephone helpline and the web sites of NHS
Choices and The Health and Social Care Information
Centre (HSCIC) [7].
Care.data led to intense debate that included editorials
and correspondence in high-ranking scientific and
medical journals, articles in news media, and activity
on social media sites. Various organisations also con-
ducted surveys to identify how many people had
knowingly received the “Better information means bet-
ter care” leaflet, felt they understood what care.data
was, supported or opposed the project, and intended
to opt out [8–10].
As practitioners of patient safety research, the au-
thors took a keen interest in the issues raised and the
potential implications for healthcare. They began fol-
lowing the development of the project, especially
through the commentary on Twitter where users were
discussing the issue in-depth. On 19 February 2014,
Tim Kelsey, the National Director for Patients and
Information at NHS England published a statement
announcing that uploads of data from general practices
would be put back to Autumn 2014 from the planned
April start date [11]. Following this announcement,
news and social media activity in relation to care.data
increased.
Social media
Social media are “web sites and applications which en-
able users to create and share content or to participate
in social networking” [12]. The two most popular social
media sites among UK adults aged 16+ are Facebook
and Twitter [13]. Communication is the primary reason
for using both sites but they provide different opportun-
ities for interaction and are used for slightly different
purposes. Whilst Facebook is used to share opinions and
photographs with friends, Twitter is used as a news
source and to keep up with current events [13, 14].
Twitter
On Twitter, users can post messages or micro-blogs,
called ‘tweets’, of up to 140 characters. Tweets can in-
clude links to other content (pictures or videos) and
websites (e.g. articles from digital editions of newspa-
pers). Approximately 500 million tweets are sent per day
and Twitter has 316 million active users [15]. Twitter
users’ accounts enable them to follow other users, sub-
scribe to their tweets, and be followed. Most tweets are
public and can be viewed by anyone, with or without a
Twitter account, but some users protect their tweets so
they are only visible to approved followers.
As a social environment, Twitter has its own etiquette
or code of good practice. This includes the use of hash-
tags, which are words, acronyms, or phrases starting
with the ‘#’ symbol and continuing without spaces.
Hashtags enable users to search for information, and fol-
low and contribute to discussions on particular topics.
Users can repost other users’ tweets, sharing them with
their followers by using the retweet function or manually
copying and reposting, adding the letters RT to the be-
ginning. Twitter users can also engage in conversations
by including each other’s usernames, which start with
the ‘@’ symbol, in tweets. However, unsolicited and un-
wanted tweets are considered spam and violate Twitter
rules.
Within the healthcare sector, Twitter can educate pa-
tients and promote positive health behaviours such as
smoking cessation and immunisation, and improve
healthcare by informing providers about the latest re-
search and guidance [16]. Healthcare researchers are
also using public tweets as a source of data. The number
of tweets including specific keywords can be counted to
monitor current trends in health-related behaviours and
infectious disease, and the sentiment of tweets can be
assessed and counted to evaluate healthcare services or
to review public opinion on planned service changes,
such as the passing of the Health and Social Care Bill in
England [17, 18]. Alongside these quantitative methods,
some studies have carried out qualitative content ana-
lysis of a random subsample of approximately 1000
tweets. One such study regarding care quality in NHS
hospitals in England, concluded healthcare services
should not be judged on the basis of tweets alone but
suggested the content of tweets could provide new in-
sights about the views of the public (complementing
other data sources), and identify where improvements
may be needed [19].
The aim of the study described in this article was to
identify and describe the range of opinions expressed
about the care.data project on Twitter for the period
during which the delay to this project was announced,
analysing the data in such a way as to provide insight
into the strengths and flaws of the project. Exploring the
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nature and character of the Twitter discourse in-depth
enabled us to provide an overview of the concerns
people had about care.data and its implementation, and
the reasons why they supported the project or the goals
of its implementation, highlighting differences of opinion
and identifying where there appeared to be a consensus.
This objective was realised using methods of qualitative
data analysis normally employed in studies of texts tran-
scribed from focus groups, ethnographic observations
(e.g. field notes) or semi-structured ‘depth’ interviews.
Methods
NCapture is a web browser extension for NVivo 10 that
can be used to create a chronological dataset or ‘batch’
of tweets, working backwards from the time of the
‘capture’. The number of tweets it is possible to capture
is determined by Twitter and the amount of traffic or
data flow on the site at that time [20]. Therefore, we
sought to collect data at set intervals until we had
gathered a target of approximately 10,000 tweets.
We logged into Twitter (as @Multimorbidity) and
searched for all tweets containing the hashtag #caredata.
The NCapture tool (for Internet Explorer) was used to
convert the search results into a dataset. Initial tests with
this tool suggested we could collate an almost continu-
ous dataset by carrying out captures at a similar time,
every three working days (from Monday-Friday). There-
fore, the capture was repeated several times around
5 pm on each assigned day, and the capture with the lar-
gest number of tweets (that is, the one covering the
longest time period) was retained. The target number of
tweets was reached on the fifth day. This final capture
encompassed all the tweets captured on the fourth day
so the latter was deleted, and four batches of tweets
were imported into NVivo.
The dataset was checked to ensure it only contained
public tweets. To make the identification of authors and
those mentioned more difficult, quotes are presented an-
onymously and the names of individuals and organisa-
tions (except for general references to the NHS) have
been replaced with their profession or type (where
known). Links to other content have also been replaced
with the word ‘link’. The study was discussed with the
University of Manchester Research Ethics Committee
who confirmed it would not require ethical approval.
However, we recognise there is ongoing debate about
the ethical issues raised by the use of this type of data
for research purposes [21].
Data analysis
We began by exploring the automated features of NVivo
to generate and count key words as contained in tweets.
However, this was not found to be a useful way of ex-
ploring the data. Instead, we used established methods
of qualitative data analysis, as normally used in semi-
structured interview studies. Following grounded theory
methods of data analysis, the tweets were read in se-
quential order, line by line, and coded in iterative fashion
according to an evolving list of themes [22, 23]. In this
manner, we were able to familiarise ourselves with the
Twitter discourse and characterise the basic thrust of
each tweet in a more nuanced way than would be pos-
sible to garner by just reading through the search results
for #caredata on Twitter or via automated methods.
Retweets and spam tweets were excluded manually.
The second author initially coded all of the included
tweets. The codes were reviewed and revised by the first
author, who combined and organised these into a the-
matic framework. Themes were sub-divided into two
equal subsets, with each author conducting a more
detailed evaluation of the codes in their set and produ-
cing a summary of each key theme. These summaries
were reviewed and amended by both authors until a
consensus was reached. The identity of the authors of
tweets was not taken into account during the analysis.
The overall aim of the analysis was to characterise the




The dataset consisted of four batches of tweets captured
on 19, 24 and 27 February, and 7 March 2014. It con-
tained 9895 tweets, which were posted over 18 days
from 5.35 pm on 17 February to 4.59 pm on 7 March
(see Fig. 1). However, there were gaps between the
batches of 20, 27 and 92 h respectively so we did not
capture any of the tweets posted during a third of this
time (138 of 431 h, 31.9 %).
A total of 6118 (61.8 %) were retweets and 240 (2.4 %)
were identified as spam and excluded from the analysis.
The 3537 ‘original’ tweets were posted by 904 contributors.
The top 5 contributors posted over a fifth of the tweets
(756, 21.4 %), with one person posting 307 (8.7 %). Each
Fig. 1 When and how many tweets were captured
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user contributed an average of 4 tweets but the vast
majority (743, 82.2 %) posted less than this. The discus-
sion involved employees and senior managers from
Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs), primary care
workers such as General Practitioners (GPs), Members of
Parliament (MPs), academics (e.g. from medicine, health
or IT security), journalists, privacy campaigners, patient
advocacy groups, activists and members of the public.
There was considerable confusion (seemingly from all
perspectives) about what care.data would involve; that is,
what data would be available to whom in what form.
Tweets seemed to reflect a variety of strategic positions
including: advancing ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ care.data arguments,
encouraging people to opt out or not, providing links to
information, correcting the perceived errors of journal-
ists and politicians, and calling for the project to be
abandoned or changed. There was also illiberal use of
humour and sometimes personal attacks on staff from
NDPBs, journalists, MPs and others.
The Twitter discourse encompassed a wide range of
topics and addressed a series of related issues. Tweets
were coded into one or more of 50 sub-themes, which
were organised into 9 key themes (see Table 1). Eight of
these highlighted the concerns people had about the car-
e.data project or its implementation, and included tweets
from users who were both against and broadly supportive
of care.data, whereas the final theme pertained to the po-
tential of care.data and the ideal model of implementation.
These findings are considered in further detail below.
As is conventional in published qualitative work, we have
characterised the frequency of tweets using descriptors
such as “often” and “some”, and presented examples of
tweets under each sub-heading to illustrate some of the
opinions expressed [24–27]. These characterisations should
not be considered accurate estimates of frequency as no
formal quantitative analysis has been carried out, and it
should also be noted that the selected quotes do not neces-
sarily represent the general or majority opinion.
Informed consent and the default ‘opt-in’
Tweets, including some that referred to surveys,
suggested that most patients were not just inadequately
informed about care.data and their right to opt out but
were not aware of the project. Some people reported
that GPs were ultimately responsible for informing
patients about care.data but this policy was questioned
in light of the already high workloads in primary care.
Tweets also reflected the variations in different GPs’
ways of informing their patients (or not).
Doctors should be helping patients understand
implications of #CareData @[medical body] How
much consultn time is this taking? [link]
Some pointed out that the information belongs to the
patients. That it is their data (ownership) and they should
be able to choose who sees what information about them,
and who doesn’t. However, it was also highlighted that
patients struggle to access their own healthcare records
and that this should be addressed before patients can make
an informed decision about sharing this information.
Seemingly radical idea: let PATIENTS control who can
access their personal medical data! #caredata
Twitter users argued that the automatic opt-in (with
the option to opt out) was not equivalent to consent but
a form of presumed consent and unethical, especially in
light of patients’ lack of awareness. The issue of consent
was a key concern for those that supported the idea of
care.data but did not agree with the way it was being in-
troduced. Users tweeted to inform people how they
could opt out, or to say they had opted out and encour-
age or even instruct others to do the same. Concerns
were also expressed that information would not be re-
moved from the database if a person opted out after
some of their data had already been transferred.
Very conflicted re: #caredata - want to support
anything that aids healthcare research, but can't see
how 'opt out' option is valid consent
@[lawyer] @[lawyer] I've opted out of #caredata you
all should before its too late
Trust
Tweets often disclosed a lack of trust surrounding the
care.data project, and the government and NHS in gen-
eral. This appeared to arise from a perceived lack of
transparency, which some interpreted as dishonesty or
incompetence. Opting out was seen as a way of declar-
ing this lack of trust. Those in support of the idea of
care.data called on relevant parties to establish trust to
stop people from opting out, or suggested people opt
out now but opt in once trust has been gained. However,
the project was seen as having an “up hill climb” ahead,
following “a shambles of a start”.
Don't trust UK governments to protect YOUR personal
data (& why would you)? —send them a message:Opt-out
of #caredata.
#caredata @[NDPB] @[NDPB staff] @[NDPB staff]
you will know when you have earned the nation's trust
when informed people begin opting back in.
The third batch of tweets included a number of refer-
ences (85, 3.7 %) to the involvement of a private IT
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Table 1 List of key themes and sub-themes
Key themes Sub-themes
1 Informed consent and the default ‘opt-in’ 1 Opt-out versus opt-in
2 Informed consent
3 Patient access to GP records
4 Apathy regarding default ‘opt-in’
2 Trust 5 Lack of trust
3 Privacy and data security 6 Identifiable data
7 Privacy
8 Security issues
9 Confidentiality of patient data
10 care.data has risks
4 Involvement of private companies 11 Data accessed by insurance companies
12 Data for sale
13 Concerns about the involvement of a private IT company
14 Data going to other private companies
15 Care.data linked to NHS privatisation
5 Legal issues and GPs’ concerns 16 Data protection
17 Legal issues
18 GPs' concerns
19 Concerns about adding genomic data later
20 Police access to care.data
6 Communication failure and confusion about care.data 21 Communication failure
22 Confusion about what care.data is
23 care.data as a media event
24 care.data leaflet and junk mail
25 Conflicts of interest
26 Public ignorance about care.data
27 Mainstream media reports on care.data
28 PR and presentation of facts
29 Critics accused of scaremongering
7 Delayed implementation 30 Delay to implementation
31 Role of activists or activism
32 Flawed project
33 Change management
34 Another NHS fiasco
35 Pause will not affect implementation
36 A failed brand
37 Costs of care.data project
38 Technological problems
39 Accuracy of medical records
8 Patient-centeredness 40 Arrogance
41 Lack of patient and public involvement
42 Lack of patient-centeredness
43 Patient ownership of medical data
44 Lack of engagement
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company in the care.data project, following a report in
the Daily Telegraph that they had “been given the con-
tract to extract patient records from GP surgeries” [28].
Users expressed shock and questioned the reasoning of
the decision makers in awarding “a big juicy contract” to
a company that had received criticism regarding its
handling of another government contract. Public trust
appeared to diminish further at this point and the num-
ber of people opting out was expected to increase.
This government refuses to learn lessons: #[private
company] are now responsible for our medical records.
Terrifying. #caredata
Considering [private company]'s infamous reputation,
does that just mean the whole country's about to opt
out? #CareData
Privacy and data security
Tweets expressed concerns about the confidentiality of
patients’ medical information, focusing on privacy rights
and the security of the data collected. In the worst case
scenario, it was suggested that fears over confidentiality
would stop people from seeking healthcare, especially
those who already find services difficult to approach,
such as those with mental health problems.
I've always struggled to open up about M/H to GP -
These days I worry where anything I disclose will end
up! o_O #[private company] #caredata #mhealth
Privacy concerns were heightened due to lack of clarity
regarding what data will be anonymised or pseudo-
anonymised, at what stage and by whom. Tweets ex-
plained the differences between anonymisation and
pseudo-anonymisation and expressed concerns that
General Practices do not have the capacity or capability
to do this. Users were also concerned that it would be
easy to carry out ‘jigsaw identification’ from the pseudo-
anonymised records, and re-identify individuals. There
was also concern that the public lacked awareness and
understanding of data security, the difference between
anonymisation and pseudo-anonymisation, and risks of
re-identification of individuals.
#NHS #caredata Too many, esp older, folk aren't data/
internet savvy enough to understand the implications.
#dataprotection #privacy #bigdata
Security concerns included the possibility that data
could be leaked or lost when being transferred, and
that the care.data database could be hacked. On occasion,
it appeared as though a lack of trust in care.data had
been carried over from other government or private
sector IT “failures” or breaches of data security. Con-
tributors requested more information about the steps
that would be taken to ensure data security, and “stiff
penalties” for those that infringe “medical privacy”. Yet
some saw care.data as a trade-off between healthcare
and privacy.
@[private company] much like all massive IT projects
(I'm thinking banks). They never turn out well.
#caredata
@[MP] I'd be delighted to read what the "package of
#caredata safeguards" contains. Are they documented
somewhere please?
The #caredata debate sounds like security (of your life
via better healthcare) vs. liberty (privacy of medical
data) - familiar to US ears
Involvement of private companies
Many expressed concerns about who their data would
be made available to, and there was much negativity at
the suggestion this could be ‘sold’ to insurance and other
private companies. Users suspected private companies
with access to care.data would carry out illegal re-
identification of individuals, and use this information to
determine who they offer financial services (such as
mortgages) to. Users also connected these issues with
the privatisation of healthcare services and accused the
government of “trying to make NHS into a for-profit
organisation” and “losing sight” of its core goals.
If NHS data is sold to insurers, & NHS continues to
privatise, are those in ‘worse health’ (i.e. poor) areas
likely lose out? #CareData
Table 1 List of key themes and sub-themes (Continued)
9 Potential of care.data and the ideal model of implementation 45 Pro care.data viewpoint
46 Ideal model of implementation
47 Benefits of open data
48 Accusing critics of scaremongering
49 Use of patient data is not new
50 Moral imperative for care.data
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These issues were mostly discussed in the second
batch of tweets but tweets on the sub-theme ‘data go-
ing to other private companies’ were prevalent in the
final batch after revelations early in March 2014 that
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) were being used by
marketing companies. For some, the involvement of
private companies out-weighed the potential benefits
of care.data.
Concerns have been raised that hospital records are
being used by private firms to advise companies how
to target their marketing #caredata
I don't care how useful the data would be to the NHS
if data is also being handed to private companies to
do with as they please. #caredata
Legal issues and GPs’ concerns
It was questioned whether or not legal or data protec-
tion experts had been involved in the development of
care.data. Others argued that care.data is exempted
from the provisions of the Data Protection Act (DPA)
under the Health and Social Care Act (2012) which was
interpreted as giving the Secretary of Health unilateral
powers to release patients’ medical information. Whilst
this study was not concerned with the factual accuracy
of such statements, this debate again highlights the
confusion or lack of clarity surrounding the care.data
project.
[link] - care.data opt-out has no legal force, so can
be ignored completely. Data is DPA exempted. #ico
#caredata #NHS #DPA
Despite containing the #caredata hashtag, a substan-
tial proportion of the tweets about medical data pro-
tection related to media reports concerning HES. This
further highlights the confusion around care.data and
suggests there is a tendency for it to be mixed-up with
other initiatives. However, it was also evident that
some sections of the media or Twitter users could
have deliberately overlooked such distinctions in an
attempt to soil the care.data brand using a form of
guilt by association.
There was also a debate about whether GPs would be
liable for breaches in patient confidentiality. This was
tied into concerns that people had not been adequately
informed about care.data. Results of surveys were re-
ferred to in tweets, suggesting that many GPs believed
their patients were not aware of care.data, and a sub-
stantial minority were planning to opt out of care.data
themselves. There was also consternation among some
GPs that professional medical bodies had approved the
scheme in its present form.
@[journalist] you should also note that as things stand
if just one pt claims not aware #caredata the GP is
liable for DPA breach
Three quarters of GPs do not think patients have been
sufficiently informed about #caredata [link]
Over 40 % of GPs intend to opt themselves out of
#CareData scheme [link]
Communication failure and confusion about care.data
No matter what people’s views were on other aspects
of care.data, there was almost universal agreement
that aspects of the publicity and communication cam-
paign were seriously flawed. A specific communica-
tion issue related to the leaflet sent to households in
an attempt to inform the public about care.data.
Tweets suggested that many households either did
not receive the leaflet or did not notice it as a result
of, what one user termed, the “junk mail fiasco”. At a
Data Protection Practitioner Conference on 3 March
2014, a show of hands revealed approximately half of
Data Protection Officers had not received the leaflet,
including the Information Commissioner. In addition,
those arguably “most concerned with privacy”, who
had opted out of ‘Royal Mail Door to Door’, did not
receive the leaflet, as doing so stops Royal Mail from
delivering unaddressed items. For those who had not
received the leaflet, some people tweeted a link to
where it could be found online. However, not having re-
ceived a leaflet was not always seen as a bad thing given
the poor quality of the content. Some saw the leaflet as a
waste of money, and a one-off mailout as an insufficient
way to inform the public about care.data.
@[unknown] apparently everyone got one - but it
looked like just another piece of junk mail [link]
#caredata #NHS
@[unknown] Indeed. I never even received the
@[NDPB]'s misinformation sheet about #caredata
The leaflet sent for #caredata is a great example of
fail-by-misplaced-moneysaving.
The media were also seen as perpetrating an ill-
informed debate, and some of those speaking about
the subject, including politicians, journalists and twit-
ter users, were accused of conflicts of interest and
factually incorrect statements. Two commonly mis-
taken ‘facts’ repeatedly pointed to were the assertions
that care.data involved “anonymous” collection and
dissemination of patient medical records, and the as-
sumption that the purpose of this sharing of primary
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care data was in order to marry up records and infor-
mation for the purposes of individual patient care.
The considerable confusion around the purpose and
anonymity of care.data, as articulated by politicians
and journalists commenting on the subject, seemingly
exacerbated the communication failures highlighted above.
Extreme examples in this regard involved repeated ridicul-
ing of spokespeople from NDPBs referring to care.data as
“anonymous” in national media (e.g. broadcast BBC
interviews); a report in Pulse Today that staff from
NDPBs had been criticised for posting inaccurate tweets
about care.data; and the case of an MP who had apolo-
gised to the Speaker for making inaccurate statements
about care.data in the House of Commons.
Excellent bit of blogging here from @[GP] on
#caredata & data literacy amongst journalists [link]
@[GP] @[GP] most pts unaware re #caredata if are
aware think it's about data starring [sharing] between
clinicians
#caredata rollout delayed by 6 months; plenty of time
for [NDPB] to admit this is not data sharing for direct
care but for secondary use
Some critics of the initiative were portrayed as “scare-
mongering” whilst those speaking in favour of care.data
were labelled as “spin doctors”. Inaccurate and ill-informed
statements on the part of apparently uncritical supporters
of the care.data project led to accusations that NDPBs and
others were involved in “spinning” care.data rather than
putting forward facts and issues in an open and transpar-
ent manner. However, some proponents felt that the bene-
fits of care.data had not been discussed fairly in the media.
@[GP] concerns are one thing, but the benefit side of
the equation needs to be aired. #caredata
Overall, the publicity campaign (including the leaflet,
and radio and TV interviews) was seen as insubstantial,
partial, light on detail and characterised by contradictory
statements. In extremis, those with responsibility for
informing the public were accused of incompetence.
#NHSPatientdata scheme handling a 'masterclass in
incompetence' #CareData #NHS [link] [link]
@[medical charity] People are now wanting to opt out
of the SCR [Summary Care Record] due to confusion &
concerns over care.data #caredata
On the face of it, the wide acknowledgments concerning
the flaws in the publicity campaign appear as at least one
of the reasons why the care.data initiative was put back.
However, critics complained that a pause to “explain the
benefits” was still insufficient or that care.data is so funda-
mentally flawed that improving communicative aspects
does not go nearly far enough.
#caredata So they think it's all about explaining
better. Words lipstick and pig come to mind; still a pig,
no matter how expertly applied.
Delayed implementation
Given the time period during which tweets were col-
lected, it was perhaps unsurprising that the delay was a
popular topic for discussion. A range of sub-themes re-
lated to delayed implementation including ‘technological
problems’ and ‘pause will not affect implementation’. It
was also associated with ‘role of activists or activism’ in
that some people interpreted the delay as a victory for
the social media information campaign. Others used the
announcement of the delay as evidence of the “flawed” na-
ture of the care.data project in support of the furtherance
of what appeared as an opt-out campaign by some activists.
Wow I have just heard news #caredata to be delayed
for 6 months.Congratulations to all tweets who keep
this campaign going #patientconsent
All those local #[patient advocacy group] who have
raised their concerns about #caredata Check out the
story @ [link] for more info!
Good to see #caredata rollout delayed. Potentially
beneficial #opendata possibilities, but lack of public
awareness of opt-out very worrying
Patient-centeredness
Overall, the care.data project was considered to have
adopted a paternalistic or “doctor knows best” approach.
The project leaders and decision makers were seen as arro-
gant and patronising, and were also accused of lying about
care.data; perhaps under the misguided assumption that this
was in the patients’ best interests, with one user describing
the project as an “arrogant incompetent ideology driven
hubristic mess”. In extreme cases, care.data was articulated
as an overt attempt to deceive the public or even repre-
senting a pursuit of “ideology over patient interest”.
@[journalist] #caredata campaign redolent of past age
in which doctors tell well-intentioned lies to patients,
for their own good of course.
This whole #caredata thing with [NDPB] is a mess:
how difficult is it to release a clear, unambiguous &
truthful statement?
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The lack of patient-centeredness was emphasised by
the lack of patient and public involvement in the devel-
opment of care.data. This was seen as a key reason why
issues of public concern had not been taken into ac-
count. Whilst some valued the project’s delay as an op-
portunity for people to get informed about care.data,
there were concerns that the additional time would only
be used to inform patients rather than listen to them
and respond to their concerns by modifying the project.
In the extreme, the project leaders were considered to
have “bunker mentality, disdain for public opinion, [and]
patronising arrogance”.
@[NDPB] continue to treat us like children. The
#caredata pause is to "explain its benefits". Well, it's
easier than having a dialogue.
@[journalist] Businessmen are now in charge at the
top. That's the nub of the problem. They don't even
grasp our concern. #caredata
Connections were made between the lack of patient
involvement in the care.data project and patients’ lack of
access to and control of their health records in general.
Some stressed the potential importance of patient in-
volvement in the management of medical records, and
their ability to perform ‘quality control’ checks on the in-
formation. There was a perception that improving the
quality of patient healthcare records should take priority
over care.data.
@[healthcare website] If we the patients could record
our own symptoms & this was collected by #caredata
Just think how that would change health
Potential of care.data and the ideal model of
implementation
A small number of people tweeted that they had abso-
lutely no concerns about care.data. Contributors pointed
to existing uses of patient data and contexts in which
large numbers of people are happy to share other per-
sonal information, for example, through online banking,
shopping loyalty cards and social media. However, the
main argument for care.data was that the benefits of
such data sharing (for populations) outweigh any risks
(for individuals).
Most are happy to share financial data online but not
healthcare data? #caredata
Disappointed #caredata is delayed. We can't all
denote [donate] a kidney but we can denote [donate]
our data to improve health of next generation.
#opendata
Tweets that were broadly supportive of care.data ap-
peared to be far fewer in number than those that were
critical. However, it would be simplistic to suggest
people were either ‘for’ or ‘against’ the initiative. Those
who acknowledged the potential benefits of care.data ap-
peared disappointed by how the project had been carried
out to-date, and some worried that too much damage
had been done and the project could not be saved, espe-
cially if the delay was not used constructively. A sizeable
proportion of contributors appeared as ‘critical friends’,
including an ‘expert minority’ who were engaged in
jointly working out what care.data actually involved and
what could be done to improve the perceived faults.
@[IT developer] What bits do you disagree with? I'd be
in favour of #opensource #caredata, but am radically
against *this* implementation.
Contributors on all sides of the debate made a dis-
cernible attempt to suggest ways in which care.data
could be made to work in ethically and technologic-
ally superior ways. Twitter users called for the project
to be opt-in, with the right to withdraw at any time,
or to have a simplified opt-out process, for example,
by making it possible to do this online. The ideal
model of implementation was said to require in-
creased transparency, public awareness and involve-
ment, and data security. Some contributors suggested
the data should be anonymised, whereas others called
for specific laws to protect privacy and clear guide-
lines regarding who has access to this data. Others
wanted more options and the ability to choose who
their data could be accessed by or for what purpose.
One user suggested there should be “transparent trials
of #caredata implementation with risk/benefit ana-
lysis”. However, the key message was that the delay to
the project should be used to fully inform the public,
listen to their views and reconsider how the project
was to be carried out.
Need an independent panel of patients, GPs, lawyers,
ethicists, researchers and commissioners to decide who
should have access to #caredata
@[MP] #caredata needs a complete rethink - proper
anonymisation, clearer information and more honesty.
[Government department] must listen to critics.
Discussion
Care.data was a popular topic of discussion on Twitter
following the start of the public information campaign,
and the announcement of the delay to the project. Con-
tributors to the Twitter discourse represented a range of
interested parties including organisations and individuals
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directly involved in the care.data project, medical bodies
and charities, healthcare providers and researchers, jour-
nalists, IT security experts, and patients. Many of the
opinions expressed neither conclusively supported nor
rejected the idea of a single database of patient informa-
tion but there was a clear consensus that care.data was a
flawed project, in terms of scope, delivery, privacy, se-
curity, transparency and management. Some did see the
benefits of such a project, which led to the development
of the theme ‘potential of care.data and the ideal model
of implementation’. Whilst this theme was distinct due
to the focus on the positives of care.data, it was also
overarching as the ideal model put forward by contribu-
tors aimed to address all of the concerns raised to some
degree.
The concerns of Twitter users were all interlinked and
we have attempted to show how in a conceptual model,
which has the delayed implementation of the project at
its heart (see Fig. 2). Contributor perceptions of privacy
and data security were influenced by their views on
the involvement of private companies in terms of the
provision of the technology and resources to support
the project or their ability to access the records in the
database. In addition to these concerns, some felt it would
only be acceptable to collect and share fully anonymised
data because of the potential to re-identify individuals and
risk their privacy, especially as patients had no control
over who their data would be available to during the
process of data collection and management or afterwards,
as they could only stay in or entirely opt-out of the
project. The legality of the project was also questioned
in relation to the Data Protection Act and GPs had
concerns about the availability of the technology required
to pseudo-anonymise data before it leaves the GP practice,
and the processes that would be put in place to ensure this
data was securely transferred and stored.
At the other end of the spectrum, the lack of patient-
centeredness was criticised. Patients lack access to their
own medical data but are expected to share this with un-
known others despite not having been able to contribute
to the design of the project. Those involved in the devel-
opment of care.data were seen as arrogant dictators, tell-
ing the population it was in their best interests without
explaining why. Many contributors suggested problems
could have been avoided, had the project been more
patient-centred and involved patients and other stake-
holders, such as GPs and data security experts. Thus,
this issue influenced trust and opinions about the quality
of communication and the default ‘opt-in’.
The failure of the publicity campaign to reach and ad-
equately inform the public was a key issue of concern.
The boundaries of the project did not appear to have
been specified, as people queried the intended purpose
of the database and who the collected data would be
made available to. The confusion about care.data and
the lack of available information only served to increase
distrust and the sense that people were unable to pro-
vide informed consent. There was also suggestion that
the dissemination method chosen (a leaflet) was decided
on the basis of cost, rather than its potential efficacy.
The uproar about the leaflet mailout and how few
people had read or even received it was seen as the pri-
mary reason for the delayed implementation.
Concerns about a ‘junk mail’ approach coupled with
the lack of a broader publicity campaign left some feel-
ing there had been a lack of transparency about the pro-
ject. Some questioned the reasons for this and suspected
that information was being withheld. Combined with
knowledge of previous failures by the organisations in-
volved in the project, these concerns led to an increased
lack of trust and resulted in people opting out and en-
couraging others to do the same. These queries added to
concerns regarding the ethics of making a project such
as this opt-out as opposed to opt-in.
It was a combination of all these factors that led to the
delay “to allow more time to build understanding of the
benefits of using the information, what safeguards are in
place, and how people can opt out if they choose to”
[11]. However, postponing the project until information
about it could be better communicated was not seen as
sufficient. Contributors to this discourse called for fun-
damental changes to be made to the way the project
would be delivered. They also specified that implementa-
tion should be postponed until all relevant stakeholders
(especially patients) had been consulted and there were
clear statements regarding how the data would be han-
dled or accessed, by whom, and how security would be
maintained. The issue of informed consent also needed
to be addressed and the process for opting out, or in, re-
vised. Only by acknowledging people’s concerns and
communicating clearly would trust be developed and
such a project be seen as acceptable.
Fig. 2 Conceptual map of key themes from Twitter discourse
about care.data
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Social media sites give individuals and organisations
the ability to share information and express their opin-
ions. Twitter enables people from many different back-
grounds and perspectives to contribute to a discussion,
reviewing the evidence for and against the standpoints
and beliefs of others, and provide feedback. Through
Twitter, contributors have the potential to educate and
persuade those they would not otherwise have been able
to communicate with. Some of those engaged in the car-
e.data conversation on Twitter believed that the public
had brought about the delay to care.data by being able
to voice their opinion through such means, although it
is not clear if the decision to delay the project was influ-
enced by this discourse. Twitter is a forum where activ-
ists can communicate directly with project leaders and
decision makers, or with influential parties such as jour-
nalists or advocacy groups but their voices may not be
heard or listened to by the relevant parties.
We were unable to find a reliable source of infor-
mation regarding the demographics of Twitter users
but the majority of those contributing to the care.data
discussion appeared to be of working-age. Thus we
may not have captured the opinions of younger and
older, and potentially more vulnerable, populations. A
wider range of opinions could have been identified
had we captured data from other social media sites,
such as Facebook. We focused on Twitter because
public tweets containing hashtags can easily be
searched and viewed by anyone with access to the
internet, regardless of whether or not they have a
Twitter account. Furthermore, people use Twitter as a
news source, a way of keeping up-to-date with
current events, and to communicate with those they
don’t necessarily know [13, 14]. However, only those
who are aware of care.data could contribute to the
discussion, and a survey carried out in June 2014 sug-
gested that over 60 % of the public were still unaware
of what care.data was [29].
We may have missed many tweets about the care.data
project by only searching for those that included the
#caredata hashtag. Furthermore, whilst the NCapture
tool for NVivo 10 enabled us to quickly and easily pro-
duce comprehensive datasets of tweets, we did not man-
age to capture a continuous stream. The gaps in data
collection could have been avoided had we captured in-
formation more frequently. Other tools, such as Spark
Streaming or Tweepy, use real-time or ‘live’ data to produce
batches of tweets without gaps but these require more
technical knowledge and are more resource intensive.
Unlike previous healthcare research studies that have
used tweets as a data source, we coded all tweets in our
dataset and only used qualitative methods of analysis
[19]. This method enabled us to present a more de-
tailed and meaningful analysis than could be derived
from counts of the nature of people’s opinions (e.g.
sentiment analysis) or through the use of coding algo-
rithms. Counting is a controversial issue in qualitative
research and whilst we have attempted to highlight
areas of consensus and disagreement we chose to
avoid counting the number of tweets per theme or
the proportion of contributors that held certain views.
This type of ‘credentialing’ counting is used to show the
representativeness of data, and requires the objective
categorisation of data into themes, which may lead re-
searchers to miss subtle differences. Furthermore, this
type of data can introduce bias, as it could be inferred that
the most frequently mentioned themes are the most im-
portant or significant [30]. The approach we took enabled
us to explore the content of tweets in-depth and identify
nuances in the contributors’ viewpoints, which would not
have been possible had we set out to provide count data
as this would have required us to categorise tweets into
dichotomies of those that expressed concern about or
were accepting of certain issues.
The consensus on Twitter appeared to be that the
care.data project is flawed and, as a minimum, requires
revision. Those with strong opinions may be more likely
to express them through social media and the Twitter
discourse cannot be assumed to reflect public opinion
especially as Twitter may be used “as a meeting place in
which those on one side of the argument … come to-
gether to share information and refine and reinforce
their own views.” [18]. The findings of a study of public
opinion regarding the passing of the Health and Social
Care Bill in England supports this suggestion. The authors
coded tweets as negative, neutral or supportive and com-
pared their findings to the results of national polling data.
The results showed a similar percentage of negative
feelings towards the reform but reported that expres-
sions of support were relatively rare on Twitter [17].
Our findings, and those of future studies taking a
qualitative approach to analysing tweets, could be
strengthened in a number of ways. Supplementary data
could be collected from other sources, such as comments
on Facebook or “below the line” in online news stories.
The authors of posts could be contacted to, with their
consent, obtain demographic and background information
that would enable data analysis to be done in context.
Alternatively, a mixed-methods approach could be taken
that would complement the in-depth qualitative analysis
with a quantitative analysis to provide a more representa-
tive ‘big picture’ view.
Conclusions
We captured tweets at a time of heated debate about
care.data, and when concerns were being raised about
the security of healthcare data in general. The use of the
#caredata hashtag on Twitter decreased since tweets
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were captured for this study, for example, only 2,667
such tweets (including retweets) were posted during
June and July 2014 [31]. Many of these tweets (455) were
posted on 1 July 2014 when the Health Committee
inquiry ‘Handling NHS patient data’ received further evi-
dence, having evolved from a more specific enquiry re-
garding the care.data project.
The ideal model put forward by the contributors to
the Twitter discourse featured suggested revisions that
addressed all the key areas of concern raised about
care.data through this forum. The concerns and recom-
mendations outlined in this paper could be used to
modify the project, promote the benefits of ‘big data’ in
relation to health, and build trust among the general public.
Twitter users expressed the opinion that care.data would
not succeed if it went ahead in its current form because
of the number of people who would opt-out, the lack of
adequate (technological) resources, and the potential
for data to fall into the “wrong hands” and be used for
non-health related purposes.
If the care.data project were to go ahead without
change there could be implications for patient safety in
primary care. Not least because a lack of trust in the
healthcare service could prevent people from seeking
the help they require, leading to under or untimely at-
tendance [32]. A lack of trust could also be detrimental
to the patient-provider relationship and lead to commu-
nication breakdowns, with patients being taciturn or
reticent to disclose certain information [32, 33].
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